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Abstract: 
Economic studies on the degree of competition (DC) in banking systems use various measures which are 
subsumed under the 1) structure- (e.g. Hirschman-Herfindahl index), 2) conduct- (e.g. Boone indicator) 
or 3) performance-oriented approach (e.g. Lerner index). Yet, the respective empirical 
operationalizations of the different DC measures are expected to represent one central construct – the 
true DC of a banking system. We review 35 studies covering 15 European banking systems from 1998 to 
2007. Contrasting the central construct hypothesis, we find substantial differences in the produced DC 
measures. Thus, the economic validity of derived conclusions regarding the competition intensity is chal-
lenged. 
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I Introduction 
Over the last decade, the efficiency of the European financial system has been a central issue 
not only in general discussions involving corporations, practitioners and politicians but also in 
corresponding academic research. Accordingly, numerous recent studies in the field of industry 
economics, financial economics, market regulation and policy advice deal with questions re-
garding the stability, profitability and the resulting general economic performance. In this in-
tense debate, the predominant fundamental underlying construct that guides the economic 
evaluation of the status quo in any national banking industry and the surrounding financial sys-
tem is the degree of competition (referred to as DC) between the market agents. 
Therefore, the DC covers a large scope of application. As a first example, when assessing the 
risk-bearing capacity of banks and the effects on the surrounding financial system, the contro-
versially discussed competition-fragility and competition-stability hypotheses are by definition 
DC-based (see Allen/Gale 2004; Berger et al. 2009; Zigraiova/Havranek 2015; Căpraru/Andries 
2015)1. Secondly, the DC is also frequently used in studies examining the profitability of particu-
lar strategic business areas of banks such as the lending business. For instance, Weistroffer 
(2013) as well as Schnabel (2014) find that in the respective German market segment, over-
capacities are usually accompanied by an exorbitantly high DC. Thirdly, DC measures are used 
to assess whether or not productivity gains can be realized. As an example, it is assumed that 
the (very) fragmented domestic markets along with an increased DC impede such productivity 
gains due to the inability to capitalize on economies of scale/scope2. Fourthly, whether or not 
the credit supply provided by private and institutional banks to private companies really satis-
fies equilibrated (i.e. market cleaning) conditions (see Love/Peria 2014) significantly depends on 
the banks’ ability to set their prices at will. Naturally, the potential market power of banks is 
determined by the DC. Finally, it is commonly accepted that the DC has a strong impact on the 
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long-term dynamic efficiency of financial markets and its segments. As an example, for the for-
mer, this point of view is commonly found in reports published by regulatory institutions (e.g., 
German Monopolies Commission, Major Report 2014). As for the letter, regarding the specific 
investment banking market segment, Bharat and Galetovic (2006) show that the degree of 
competition (i.e. dimensions of competition) has a substantial effect on the resulting incentives 
to invest in firm-specific relationships which in the end affects the market’s efficiency.    
Consequently, the accurate quantitative DC measurement which in turn allows for valid qualita-
tive economic evaluations of the true competitive conditions in a given financial system (e.g., in 
a country or region) is a prerequisite for effectively supporting decision makers in regulatory 
institutions, the government or even the upper and middle bank management. To date, the 
academic literature has established a set of three general conceptual approaches to measure 
the DC based either on 1) structure- (e.g. the DC measure of Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index), 2) 
conduct- (e.g. Boone indicator) or 3) performance-oriented information (e.g. the Lerner index).  
However, regardless of the specific underlying conceptual approach, the quantitative (i.e. nu-
merical) operationalization of the specific DC measures subsumed under those approaches can 
be difficult due to a lack or the insufficiency of available data, among other reasons. As a con-
sequence, even identical DC measures that follow the same conceptual approach (e.g. the per-
formance of banks as measured by the price-cost-margin-based Lerner index) are calculated as 
indicators using different approximations for the required formula terms, such as the proxies 
used for the market prices and marginal costs. However, in the end, each indicator presented in 
academic research has been explicitly developed to measure solely one particular central con-
struct: The true DC of the industry under examination. Therefore, despite the diversity in the 
conceptual approaches, measures and approximations, the produced DC indicators should in 
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the end yield the same result, in that they allow for a valid qualitative economic evaluation of 
the real competitive condition in the market (i.e. ‘the central construct hypothesis’). 
Against this background, the present work contributes to the field in that it is the first that ex-
amines the central construct hypothesis by reviewing 35 studies on DC measurements using 
differing approaches, DC measures and indicators. Overall, the reviewed studies cover 15 Euro-
pean banking systems over a period of ten years (1998 – 2007), hence providing a profound 
overall database that includes 5,784 observations3.  
In sharp contrast to the central construct hypothesis, the analysis indicates significant (and to 
some degree outstanding) discrepancies in the measured DC values and the derived interpreta-
tions regarding the prevalent competitive conditions in the banking systems. Specifically, in an 
aggregated analysis at the conceptual approach level (i.e. averaged across DC measures sub-
sumed under each of the three general conceptual approaches at a given time), the market-
performance- (vs. conduct-) oriented measures produce significantly higher (vs. lower) DC val-
ues, hence clearly indicating an intense (vs. diminished) degree of competition, whereas the 
structure-oriented DC values indicate a mid-level intensity of competition. Secondly, in a disag-
gregated analysis at the measure level (i.e. a comparison of DC measures within each of the 
conceptual approaches), further inconsistencies such as contradicting temporal changes of DCs 
both across, as well as within, national banking systems were identified. Finally, even when fo-
cusing on DC measure applications at the indicator level (i.e. operationalized through different 
approximations), substantial differences in the produced DC values and the derived intensity of 
competition as predicted for a selected point in time and country are detected.  
Thus, the profound cross- and longitudinal analyses presented in this work clearly indicate that 
the economic validity of DC measurements at least partly comes into question: The DC meas-
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ure-based qualitative evaluation of the actual state of competition seems to be rather sensitive 
to the application of a specific approach, measure and approximation, respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides a brief theoretical 
background on DC measurements along with a literature review on prominent DC measures 
and indicators found to be well-established in the academic literature. Next, the general em-
pirical background of the present work, the observed data, steps in data preprocessing and the 
general format of the created database (i.e. dimensions: year, country, DC measure) along with 
the respective sources (reviewed studies) are introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter Four pre-
sents the results of the analysis of the DC measures at several levels of aggregation, which is 
finally followed by concluding remarks and a brief discussion of the findings in Chapter Five.    
 
 
II Background and Literature Review on Competition Measurements  
II (i) The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm: Conceptual Approaches and 
Subsumed DC Measures 
In industrial economics, the measurement of competition is fundamentally based on the struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP). The SCP paradigm was introduced to the field by 
Mason (1939) and Bain (1956) as an explanatory chain of reasoning, according to which a unidi-
rectional causal relation between the market structure, the market conduct and the resulting 
market performance of economic agents in an industry exists (Tirole 1988).  
In the context of banking and financial systems, leading economists reasonably suppose that 
diminished competition between the economic agents in a defined market as indicated by a 
growing market concentration strongly favors collusive behavior. Consequently, as the concen-
tration in the market increases, the banks are motivated to capitalize on their potential pricing 
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power on both the asset as well as the liability side, which leads to increased market prices 
(that is: prices above marginal costs4). In the end, substantial surplus profits for banks at the 
expense of social welfare are realized (Bolt/Humphrey 2015, Fu et al. 2014).  
Admittedly, the assumption that this unidirectional, cohesive causality stringently holds along 
all the steps of the SCP’s functional chain has been partly challenged by economists, e.g. by 
Demsetz’ efficient structure hypothesis (1974) or the well-accepted theory of contestable mar-
kets (Baumol 1982). However, the general underlying idea of a multi-level chain configuration 
constitutes a proper classification framework: It incorporates indirect conceptual approaches at 
two preceding stages (structure and conduct approach) and one direct approach considering 
the market outcome (performance-oriented approach)5, under which the various DC measures 
can be subsumed (see Fig. 1). The following subsections briefly introduce prevalent DC meas-
ures that have been established so far in the academic literature.  
Place Figure 1 approximately here. 
 
II (i) 1. Indirect DC Measures Subsumed under the Market Structure-
Oriented Approach   
The respective structure of a market can be incorporated in DC measurements either by con-
sidering the mere number of suppliers or by the distribution (i.e. the inequality) of the supplier 
size (Hall/Tideman 1967). Due to relatively low data requirements and their analytical simplic-
ity, two DC measures have become the established standard for this market structure-oriented 
approach6. First, a mere k-concentration ratio (CRk) can be calculated as the sum of all market 
shares of the k-largest companies in an industry (where k is usually set to 3 or 5). At the one 
extreme, this DC measure is zero when many suppliers along with small market shares fiercely 
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compete with each other, whereas the CRk produces a DC measure value of exactly one at the 
other extreme (i.e. in a monopoly).  
Secondly, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) takes into account information about all the 
suppliers (N) in the examined relevant market. The HHI measure was independently developed 
by A.O. Hirschmann (1945) and O.C. Herfindahl (1950) as a general statistical measure of con-
centration. Formally, the sum of the squared market shares of the economic agents is consid-
ered, thus weighing shares of larger companies much stronger than those of smaller ones. Since 
the HHI not only captures the absolute but also the relative concentration in a market, it in-
creases with a) a decline in the number of suppliers and b) an increase in the inequality of the 
shares of suppliers in the defined market (see Hirschman 1964). Expressed as decimal numbers 
(i.e. calculations are based on market shares between zero and one), the HHI value will logically 
fall in a range between 1/N and one, with the latter (former) indicating a monopolistic (per-
fectly competitive) market situation. Given that percentages (e.g. 25%) of suppliers’ market 
shares are used for HHI calculations, perfect competition produces an HHI value of 10,000/N, 
whereas the upper boundary in the case of a monopoly is 10,000.   
 
II (i) 2. Indirect DC Measures under the Market Conduct-Oriented Ap-
proach  
Generally similar to the market structure-oriented approaches, the so-called non-structuralistic 
DC measures try to ascertain the competitive intensity in an indirect way by examining pricing- 
and quantity-based strategies as pursued by the economic agents in the marketplace. In the 
present academic research, two particular DC measures are considered as standard tools for 
this approach: The Panzar-Rosse model (1987) and the Boone indicator (2008)7.  
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The Panzar-Rosse model is based on the assumption that a company’s response in the form of 
passing on the input prices (e.g. for deposits of banks) to the demand side varies depending on 
the respective market configuration. Specifically, the sum of elasticities of the input prices – the 
so-called H statistic – is measured by estimating the revenue function. The percentage change 
of a company’s revenues as a response to an increase of input prices (or marginal costs, respec-
tively) by one percent is negative (or equals zero) in the case of a monopoly8. In contrast, the 
value of the H statistic is positive and falls in a range between >0 and one (exactly one) in the 
case of intense competition (perfect competition). Specifically, in the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium, an increase in the input prices (and thus, the costs) reflects a mere upward shift of 
the average cost function and should therefore lead to a proportionate increase in prices. Con-
sequently, since the optimum level of bank output remains unchanged, revenues change in 
strict correspondence to the increased input prices (H=1).  
The Boone indicator (β) deduces the degree of competition from the cost-oriented inefficiency 
as observed in the respective markets. Boone’s DC measure β is based on Demsetz’ (1973) no-
tion that companies realize larger profits the more productive they are9. In the end, inefficiently 
operating agents suffer more (lose relatively more market share and profit) from increased 
competition than efficiently working firms (Leon 2015). Consequently, this reallocation-effect 
monotonically increases with competition intensity, i.e. when companies interact more aggres-
sively and entry barriers tend to disappear (Liu et al. 2010). Formally, the strength of the ratio 
(i.e. the elasticity) between the profits and the marginal production costs at a given output level 
of the operating financial institution has to be determined (Boone 2008: 1246 p.). Boone’s β is 
negative as it simply mirrors the fact that higher marginal costs are associated with lower prof-
its. In addition, it falls within the range of [-1; 0] which is why lower values indicate more com-
petitive market conditions. Logically, given that a bank operates in a strongly competitive envi-
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ronment, an increase of the marginal costs by one percent will lead to declining profits. Con-
versely, in the case of a monopolist having distinctive price-setting power, the bank can com-
pletely pass the costs on to the other market side, hence keeping the resulting profits at the 
initial level10. 
II (i) 3. Direct DC Measures under the Market Performance-Oriented Ap-
proach 
Direct performance-based DC measures are often reported in public or governmental statistics. 
Commonly, those measures are either based on mere financial statement variables (e.g. the net 
operating profits, earnings before interest and taxes [EBIT], etc.) or they reflect a certain type of 
interest-based margin (e.g. the bank-specific interest rate for a loan minus the current base rate 
in the lending business).  
However, in academic studies, especially those addressing the banking sector, the Lerner index 
(LI) is by far the most commonly applied direct DC measure11. The LI was introduced in the 
seminal contribution of Abba P. Lerner published in 1934 in the Review of Economic Studies. 
The LI assesses the individual market power of suppliers with respect to their general capability 
to set their prices above the marginal costs. Specifically, in its original form, the LI is defined as 
the margin between the required output price and the marginal cost expressed as a percentage 
of the former. Logically, the calculated LI values fall within a range between zero (to be more 
precise: it converges to zero) in the case of perfect competition and almost one (or 100%) un-
der a monopolistic market condition. In general, this means that the weaker (vs. stronger) the 
competitive pressure in a given market, the higher (lower) the possible price markup on the 
perfectly competitive price and the higher (vs. lower) the resulting Lerner index LI. 
As a summarizing overview, Table 1 depicts formulas, terms, variables and ranges of all the 
abovementioned indirect and direct DC measures subsumed under the three conceptual ap-
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proaches. Furthermore, some major strengths and weaknesses of each DC measure are given in 
the table’s last column, as recently discussed in more detail by Leon (2015).  
Place Table I approximately here. 
II (ii) Empirical Application of DC Measures in Academic Research: Proxies and In-
dicator 
As the mathematical formulae depicted in Table 1 reveal, the empirical application of the pro-
posed DC measures requires certain types of information. However, at first glance it becomes 
obvious that the numerical calculation of the DC measures and the respective terms/variables 
can be hampered by the data requirements. Specifically, this means that the needed informa-
tion is either a) not available at all (e.g., because it is based on a bank’s internal business data 
not accessible to the researcher) or b) not unambiguously defined because several types of 
data may be used to represent a certain construct such as the ‘input prices’ as a main part of 
the Boone indicator’s formula. 
As a natural solution for this obstacle, certain approximations (usage of proxies) are required 
and applied by researchers in competition measurements, thereby finally creating specified 
indicators for DC measures. By definition, the term indicator is further used in this work as a 
synonym for a certain DC measure that is operationalized in a distinct way by using particular 
proxies for required formula constructs, terms and variables. Naturally, the applied operation-
alizations may substantially differ in that they use quite different proxies for the terms and 
variables of an identical DC measure. 
As a first example of differing approximations, thereby creating different indicators for one dis-
tinct DC measure, consider the construct market shares. Market shares are one of the require-
ments for determining the k-largest banks’ cumulative share (CRk) or the DC measure of HHI. It 
is obvious that the required shares can be calculated in different ways, e.g. based on values 
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(monetary value) or quantities (units sold). As for the most commonly used (but by far not the 
only one applied) indicator CR3, the required shares of the three largest banks are approxi-
mated in a value-oriented way by calculating the ratio between each of the three largest banks’ 
total assets and the sum of all the banks’ total assets. However, it is clear that these total assets 
relationships are only one specific approximation of market shares. As only one of several coun-
terexamples, Bertay and Demirgüc-Kunt (2013) apply CRk indicators using quantitative market 
shares of banks based on loan volumes and deposit volumes12.  
Secondly, the determination of the cost functions of banks has to be considered. Specifically, 
banks’ marginal costs are likewise required to compute, e.g., the performance-based Lerner 
index in DC measurements. Again, further specifications on which proxy best reflects the true 
marginal costs are required. Among others, assumptions have to be made on whether costs for 
physical capital dispositions or labor costs shall be included in or excluded from marginal costs. 
As an example for the latter proxy, average (international/national) deposit rates could be ap-
plied to properly gauge marginal costs in a national lending business (see e.g. Gischer et al. 
2015). By contrast, Liu et al. (2010) computed the marginal cost (of total assets) from a stan-
dard translog function with a single output (total assets) and three input prices (deposits, labor 
and physical capital). The same issue of varying cost approximations applies to empirical appli-
cations of the conduct-oriented indirect Boone indicator β. For instance, Delis (2012) employs 
the ´true´ marginal cost based on modified interest rates in the denominator of β. By contrast, 
other researchers suppose the (easier to determine) long-term average costs to be proper prox-
ies for long-term marginal costs (Schaeck and Cihák 2013)13. 
Third, as an established standard, market prices as required for calculations of the widely used 
Lerner index are usually approximated as the aggregated ratio of a bank’s total revenues and 
total assets (e.g. Weill 2013, Coccorese 2014). This notion is based on the idea that banks are 
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providers of only one single (aggregated) output good (Kim and Berg 1994). However, as re-
cently discussed in research, especially in the case of studies examining the market power in a 
particular business segment (e.g. the lending business), those aggregated approaches are sub-
ject to several major flaws (Gischer et al. 2015). Therefore, instead of utilizing data on the total 
income, the bank’s true output price could alternatively be approximated for that business 
segment as a modified lending interest rate (averaged across all loan categories but weighted 
by volume).  
 
A major problem of DC measurements becomes obvious that has, to date, surprisingly been 
neglected to some degree in academic research. Banks operate, in fact, almost always as multi-
product companies in diverse markets/market segments (i.e. strategic business areas) which 
may exhibit different competitive levels – mostly regional and at the product level. Conse-
quently, the correct definition of the relevant product and geographic markets would be neces-
sary prior to any DC measurement and the selection of proper approximations of required 
terms and variables, respectively. However, as emphasized by Plearsikas (2001), it is exactly the 
practical application of correctly defining the true relevant market14 that still constitutes a fun-
damental obstacle, especially in the field of industrial economics.  
Finally, another fundamental problem that emerges, especially in DC measurements in the 
banking industry and which inevitably leads to the application of different approximations, is 
that no consensus among academics exists regarding the actual production function of banks. 
Specifically, two contradictory points of view are prevalent, namely the intermediation vs. the 
production view. Intermediation was introduced by Sealey/Lindley (1977) and classifies the 
deposits of a bank as mere input goods that are required to provide loans. Consequently, banks 
take on the role of an intermediary institution procuring deposits and loans (Bencivenga/Smith 
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1991). Contrary to this notion, Benston (1965) introduced the production view, according to 
which deposits are considered output goods produced by the bank. The immanent dilemma of 
these differing production function concepts regarding DC measurements becomes obvious: 
Depending on the underlying point of view, only specific approximations can be considered 
valid. As an example, the Panzar-Rosse model along with the H statistic assumes that a com-
pany’s behavior of passing the banks’ input prices on to the demand side depends on the com-
petitive pressure. Formally, the percentage change of revenue as a response to an increase of 
input prices is estimated. Following the intermediation view, the company’s input price-
revenue function has to be formulated exclusive of deposits on the dependent variable side 
(revenue) and inclusive of deposits on the independent side (input prices). In sharp contrast, 
under the production view deposits must be exclusively considered as an output, thereby effec-
tively influencing revenues, but not the input prices or costs. Obviously, differing approxima-
tions (and thus: varying indicators), with respect to the content and the drivers of revenue 
functions, output prices, input prices, marginal cost or even revenue-oriented market shares, 
can emerge for the DC measures under these competing production function views.   
 
To sum up the considerations so far, the competition measurement can be realized using dif-
ferent ways. On the one hand, researchers widely agree on the fact that the introduced DC 
measures and applied indicators are not perfect substitutes (see e.g. Leon 2015). On the other 
hand, regardless of the applied approaches, DC measures and approximations, the resulting 
indicators are meant to be valid in that they avoid misjudgments and reflect the actual degree 
of competition in a given, thoroughly defined market (i.e. central construct hypothesis).  
The empirical work described in the following chapters has been conducted to examine this 
hypothesis in the context of the European financial system.   
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III The Dataset 
III (i) Sources (Studies), Dimensions, Data Points of the Database 
To examine the question of to what extent the discussed DC measures and indicators produce 
consistent results, thereby confirming the central construct hypothesis, a profound secondary 
research study (i.e. meta-study) was carried out. Specifically, 35 studies published for the most 
part in highly-ranked academic journals15 were reviewed to collect the empirically determined 
values of applied DC measures. As for the respective dimensions of the compiled original data-
base, a `country x time x DC measure` structure was established. By doing so, both longitudinal 
analyses (i.e. changes over time) as well as cross-sectional analyses (object-related comparisons 
with respect to the applied indicators of DC measures at different levels of aggregation, as well 
as countries, at a given time [i.e. year]) could be realized.   
Regarding the first dimension of countries included in this investigation, the following 15 devel-
oped members of the European Union were considered: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany 
(DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lux-
embourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
This selection focused on the actual importance of those countries’ national banking systems 
for the overall European economy. Specifically, regarding the GDP realized in 2016, the respec-
tive countries ranged from the largest national economy Germany (GDP2016: 3.1 trillion €) to 
Greece, ranked 15th (GDP2016: 176 billion €). Note that as the one and only exception, Poland 
was deliberately substituted by Luxembourg in the sample of this investigation as the latter’s 
capital city contains the headquarters of numerous European institutions (e.g. European Court 
of Justice, European Commission).  Moreover, Luxembourg is considered to be among the 
wealthiest nations of the world with one of the highest GDP per capita. 
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Secondly, as for the time dimension, published DC measurements addressing the years be-
tween 1998 and 2007 were included in the database. For researchers in the field of banking and 
finance, this ten-year period evidently covers an interesting range highly relevant for DC meas-
urements, which is proven by the number of publications considering this span (e.g. Liu et al. 
2010). As for the starting point of the observation period, 1998 was deliberately chosen as it 
represents the year preceding the introduction of the common currency euro as book money in 
the eurozone (date of release: 31 December 1998). As for the endpoint of the time period, 
2007 likewise marks an important cornerstone for the European financial system as it preludes 
the onset of the financial crisis which finally spread worldwide in 2008. This way, the increasing 
influence of the associated external shocks, e.g. in the form of extraordinary risk premiums 
which essentially affected – if not even biased – the competition measurement in 2008 and in 
the following years, was deliberately disregarded. 
Thirdly, as for the selected items constituting the DC measures dimension, the applied indica-
tors of the following list were considered, as introduced in detail in the previous chapter: 1) the 
common structure-oriented concentration measures CR3, CR5 and HHI, 2) the conduct-oriented 
H-statistic and Boones’ β and 3) the performance-oriented Lerner index (LI). 
As an example of the data points considered as the respective input in the original database 
along those three dimensions, Table 2 depicts an extract from the recent contribution of 
Clerides et al. (2015) as published in the journal Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments. 
Specifically, the authors measure the DC for national banking systems using indicators for profit 
elasticities and the Lerner index from 1997 to 2010. In line with the defined limits of the three 
dimensions in the present database, only data points in the years 1998-2007 for the DC meas-
ure Lerner index, as calculated for the 15 selected European countries, were incorporated.   
Place Table II approximately here.16  
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III (ii) Data (Pre-) Processing, Missing Data and Conversions 
As shown in Table 1 (DC measurement approaches, related DC measures, formulae, ranges of 
values), the DC measures may differ in direction, in that lower values indicate higher competi-
tion intensity for some DC measures (e.g. the Lerner index values) but a lower degree of com-
petition for others (e.g. H-statistic). Therefore, in order to enhance transparency and facilitate 
comparisons as well as interpretations in the later analyses, the original DC values in the data-
base were numerically harmonized. Specifically, the actual DC values underwent a specific 
transformation in order to create modified values that unisono express the actual percentage of 
the maximum possible degree of competition with a natural upper bound (extreme value) of 
100 % or 1.00, respectively. As an example, let any given country’s structure-oriented DC ratio 
CR3 take on a value of 0.20. This relatively low level of bank concentration indicates a low de-
gree of market power along with a high degree of competition in that banking system. In a per-
fectly competitive market (vs. monopoly) CR3 would be exactly 0 (vs. 1). Consequently, the 
original value of 0.20 has to be transformed into a modified value of 0.80 (or 80%) as the actual 
value of 0.20 reflects 80% of the maximum possible competition value (0) on a scale ranging 
from zero to one. The same transformation was applied to any other DC measure requiring a 
respective counter-directional preprocessing.  
Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that the resulting database structure represents a rather 
incomplete, disproportional design that naturally incorporates unequally distributed cell fre-
quencies and even some missing data. Specifically, it is clear that not all of the studies of the 
present database include the entire information on the totality of the six considered DC meas-
ures in the fifteen selected European countries over the ten-year time span from 1998 to 2007. 
As a consequence, specific cells in the database that cover “prominent” combinations of attrib-
ute values along the dimensions and which are, therefore, in the special interest of researchers 
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(e.g., Lerner index-based DC measurements in the German banking system in 2007) include 
numerous observations, whereas other cells are rather underrepresented.  
As for a further necessary conversion, some of the included studies have reported DC measures 
in a certain country as mean values over a specific time span rather than yearly observations. As 
an example, in the laudable empirical comparison of DC measures (LI vs. HHI vs. H-statistic) 
published by Carbo and colleagues (2009) in the Journal of International Money and Finance, a 
mean H-statistic value is reported in European financial systems (e.g. Germany) over an obser-
vation period from 1995 to 2001. As a result of the conversion applied in the present work, the 
reported mean value was divided, thereby creating four estimated data points for Germany  
(i.e.: for 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) falling in the considered time span between 1998-2007.  
In the end, the final database created for the present analysis contains a total of 5,784 data 
points. Table 3 gives a summarizing overview of the considered 35 studies sorted by the DC 
measures (in rows) as well as countries (columns) as reported therein. 
Place Table III approximately here. 
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IV Empirical Analysis  
The following section reports the results of the comparison of DC measurements with respect 
to the central construct hypothesis. In line with the structure of Table 1 and the chain of rea-
soning presented in Chapter 2, the steps in analysis are oriented towards three different levels 
of aggregation along the database dimension of DC measures. Specifically, at the aggregated 
approach level, Chapter 4.1 examines whether or not the DC measures subsumed under the 
market structure- (S), market conduct- (C) and the market performance-oriented approaches 
(P) produce on average comparable results. Next, Chapter 4.2 follows a medium disaggregated 
analysis path at the level of the six DC measures under examination. Finally, Chapter 4.3 is fo-
cused on specific approximations of the applied DC measures at the indicator level. In each of 
the subchapters, cross sectional analyses for a given point of time (e.g. 1998 as the starting 
point of the observation period) as well as longitudinal analyses (such as developments over 
the time span 1998-2007) are carried out. The results are further differentiated along the data-
base’s third dimension as averages across all the 15 countries or country-specific DC measure-
ment values. Figure 2 provides examples for the resulting “slice & dice” procedures as known 
from online analytical processing (OLAP) in data mining in databases. 
Place Figure 2 approximately here. 
IV (i) Analyses at the Approach Level: Aggregated S/C/P Values in DC Measure-
ments  
The analysis at the approach level reveals substantial differences in the degree of competition 
under the structure-, conduct- and the performance-oriented DC measures both in a cross-
sectional as well as longitudinal analysis. Specifically, Table 4 gives an overview of DC values as 
reported for the year 1998 as the starting point of the present observation period. Averaged 
across the selected 15 national banking systems, an overall mean score of 0.65 (i.e. 65% of the 
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maximum possible competition intensity) is indicated. However, the performance-oriented DC 
measures (i.e. Lerner index applications) produce a competition score of 0.87 (87%), thereby 
indicating a highly competitive market environment. In contrast, the DC measures subsumed 
under the conduct-oriented approach imply a sound market power of banks along with a dimin-
ished competition score of only 40%. Positioned between these two opposing values, the struc-
ture-oriented DC measures produce a mid-level intensity of competition (68%).   
Place Table IV approximately here.17  
In a deeper country-specific analysis, this finding of contradictory DC levels holds for most of 
the observed countries. As for the example of the Greek banking system, DC values under the 
structure-oriented approach (S) indicate a mid-level competition intensity (0.55) which is con-
trasted by high DC values amounting to 0.88 under the performance-based DC measures (P) 
and a very low competition score (0.25) produced under the conduct-oriented approach (C). 
Overall, the resulting general ranking order in DC values at the approach level (P>S>C) holds for 
87% (13 out of 15) of the countries with the only exceptions being Finland and Italy. The re-
spective systematic differences are statistically significant at the 1% level in pairwise two-sided 
t-tests (S vs. C: t28=6.16, p<0.01; S vs. P: t28= -4.78, p<0.01; C vs. P: t28= -19.62, p<0.01).  
Furthermore, in a longitudinal analysis covering the ten-year percentage change of the pro-
duced DC values under the three approaches over the years 1998-2007, substantial discrepan-
cies in the observed trends become salient. Averaged across the 15 countries under examina-
tion, the DC values under the S approach are positioned almost at the same level in 1998 and 
2007 (-0.65%), whereas the DC values under the C (vs. P) approach increase (vs. diminish) over 
the ten years of observation by no less than +12.83% (vs. -6.46%).  
Finally, as depicted in Figure 3, the identified general systematic difference in terms of the or-
der of DC values produced under the approaches consistently holds throughout the whole time 
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span. That is, from the beginning of the observation period (1998) until the end (2007), DC val-
ues subsumed under the P (vs. S vs. C) approach produce the highest (vs. smallest vs. medium) 
DC values, thereby indicating a fierce (vs. diminished vs. medium) competition intensity. 
Place Figure 3 approximately here. 
To sum up the findings thus far, the result of assessments of the observed markets’ competition 
intensity and their change over time seems to be sensitive to the application of a certain DC 
measurement approach. Thus, the central hypothesis is violated. 
 
IV (ii) Analyses at the DC Measure Level (Disaggregated DC Values) 
The more disaggregated analysis of the six DC measures considered in this work regarding the 
year 1998 (see Table 5) further reveals severe inconsistencies, thereby raising further doubts as 
to what extent those measures represent the same measurement construct in the form of the 
true competition intensity. Specifically, averaged across the 15 countries, the concentration 
measures CR3 (DC=0.60), CR5 (0.49) as well as the H-statistic (0.50) indicate a medium degree of 
competition intensity. At variance with this presumption, Boones’ β suggests assuming a dimin-
ished degree of competition along with a substantial market power of banks (0.29), whereas 
the performance-oriented LI (0.87) as well as the HHI (0.89) provide strong support for the as-
sumption that the competition between national banks in the European financial system is best 
considered intense to fierce. 
In line with this finding, the country-specific analysis in Table 5 further depicts the vivid spreads 
between the minimum and maximum scores of the national DC values. Considering the French 
banking system as an example, this deviation amounts to a remarkable 73% spread as the HHI 
predicts on the basis of five reported DC measurements a score of 96% of the maximum possi-
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ble competition intensity, whereas Boones’ β (based on six values) amounts to only 23%, which 
points to weak competition and a substantial market power of French banks, respectively.       
As a further inconsistency, the expected relationship between CR3 and CR5 values (i.e. CR3 < CR5) 
is contradicted both on average as well as for six out of the 15 observed countries.18   
Place Table V approximately here. 
Additionally, despite the observed absolute and systematic differences between the DC meas-
ures across the countries, pairwise correlations19 between the produced DC measures along the 
15 countries are supposed to meet two natural conditions: They should be a) unidirectional, in 
that they produce a positive sign, and b) substantial in value as to indicate a strong relation 
along with statistical significance. However, as depicted in Table 6 for the year 1998, in contrast 
to what the central hypothesis would predict, six out of the 15 respective pairwise correlations 
between the DC measures considered in this study have a negative sign. Specifically, the 
Boones’ β is negatively correlated with CR3, CR5, the Lerner index and even with the (likewise 
conduct-oriented) H statistic. Further, only three of the remaining nine correctly signed (i.e. 
positively signed) correlations are of both economical as well as statistical significance. Specifi-
cally, they indicate a moderate/strong correlation which is at least larger than 0.5. This at least 
logically pertains to the three structure-oriented measures CR3, CR5 and HHI. However, the re-
maining six correlations (e.g. between Lerner index vs. CR3, or H statistic vs. CR5) fail to reach 
statistical significance which obviously contradicts the central construct hypothesis. 
Place Table VI approximately here. 
Moreover, discrepancies are likewise detected in the longitudinal analysis covering the pro-
duced ten-year percentage change in DC values between 1998 and 2007 as observed for the 15 
countries. As depicted in Table 7, the resulting inconsistencies must be considered dramatic to 
a certain degree. Specifically, averaged across the 15 countries, while some DC measures (CR3, 
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H statistic, Boone indicator) detect an increase in the competitive pressure, the opposite is true 
for CR5, HHI and the Lerner index. Further, taking the Greek banking system as a country-
specific example, the H statistic indicates a 46% increase in competition intensity over the ob-
servational decade whereas the Lerner index predicts it to shrink by more than 12%.  
In summary, results indicate that the central hypothesis does not hold at the level of DC meas-
ures in the respective cross-sectional (i.e. country-specific) as well as in longitudinal analyses.   
Place Table VII approximately here. 
IV (iii) Analyses at the Indicator Level: A Critical Look at Specific DC Measure Appli-
cations 
The analysis of the six DC measures at the most disaggregated indicator level likewise provides 
strong support for a rejection of the central construct hypothesis. Specifically, the findings pre-
sented in this subchapter are based on specific applications (i.e. different operationalizations) 
of the six introduced DC measures in the German banking system. To this end, Table 8 gives an 
overview of the number of observations as reported in the respective studies covering this na-
tional banking system using specific operationalizations for the years 1998 and 2007. 
According to the analysis and in line with the previous findings, the heterogeneity in the result-
ing assessment of the true competitive conditions in the German banking system across the 
alternative DC measures proves to be true. Specifically, the average spread between the high-
est and the lowest competition score as produced by the total of 40 (vs. 17) applications of the 
considered six DC measures was 20% in 1998 (13% in 2007). As for the respective DC measures 
that seem to be most sensitive to varying applications, this spread is above average in 1998 for 
applications of the Boone indicator (41%) as well as the H statistic (26%). In addition, when con-
sidering the Lerner index application by Maudos/Fernández de Guevara (2007) as calculated for 
1998, a nearly maximum competition score of 97% is detected. However, the apparent conclu-
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sion of a de facto perfect competition is challenged by the Lerner index application of Ayadi et 
al. (2009), who determined a closer to mid-level competition score of 67%, which clearly indi-
cates a substantial degree of market power of German banks. In the end, a remarkable intra-
measure spread of 30% is produced for the Lerner index. Note that this Lerner index-specific 
spread between the highest and lowest produced DC values is even larger for measurements in 
2007, when it amounted to 48%. Taking into account that this spread is based on a small num-
ber of studies (n=7), the significance of divergence in the produced competition score is further 
highlighted. 
Moreover, as obviously the most frequently applied DC measure in current competition meas-
urements in local, national and global financial systems, the various operationalizations of the 
Lerner index seem to be especially prone to producing substantial variations in the DC values. 
As a vivid example, consider the German banking system in 2003, which was subjected to a to-
tal of nine studies in that year. Regarding the results, Ayadi et al. (2009) as well as Gischer et al. 
(2015) calculate competition scores that indicate at best mid-level competition along with a 
latent market power of banks (DC=58% and 46%, respectively). By comparison, the Lerner index 
applications as published by Brissimis (2014) and Koetter/Vins (2008) report higher competi-
tions scores of 81% and 76% for the same market. Finally, both Liu et al. (2010) as well as Coc-
corese (2014) report Lerner index values that amount to 92%, thereby clearly indicating fierce 
competition in the German banking system.     
To summarize, even in an intra-measure-comparison at the most specified indicator level, sub-
stantial differences in the produced DC values emerge which, again, challenge the notion of a 
valid central construct hypothesis. 
Place Table VIII approximately here. 
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V Discussion  
The main objective of the present study was to determine whether the various applications of 
DC measures applied to gauge the degree of competition in banking systems would lead to 
identical conclusions regarding assessments of the true competition intensity. Specifically, de-
spite the diversity in the developed conceptual approaches, measures and applied approxima-
tions, the produced DC values should in the end yield the same result, in that they allow for a 
valid qualitative economic evaluation of the real competitive condition in the examined market 
(i.e. ‘the central construct hypothesis’). Against this background, the present work is based on a 
profound review of 35 academic studies providing 5,784 data observations for empirically ori-
ented DC measurements in 15 important national banking systems in the European Union in 
the years 1997 to 2008.  
In sharp contrast to the assumed central construct hypothesis, the analysis indicates out-
standing discrepancies in the produced DC values. Specifically, in an aggregated analysis at the 
conceptual approach level (i.e. averaged across DC measures subsumed under each of the 
three general conceptual approaches), the market-performance- (vs. conduct-) oriented meas-
ures produce significantly higher (vs. lower) DC values, hence clearly indicating an intense (vs. 
diminished) degree of competition, whereas the structure-oriented DC values indicate a mid-
level competition intensity.  
Secondly, in a disaggregated analysis at the measure level (i.e. a comparison of DC measures 
within each of the conceptual approaches), further inconsistencies, such as contradicting tem-
poral changes of DCs both across as well as within national banking systems, were identified.  
Finally, even when focusing on specific DC measure applications at the indicator level (i.e. op-
erationalized through different approximations), substantial differences in the produced DC 
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values and the derived intensity of competition as predicted for a selected point of time and/or 
country are detected.  
As a consequence, the profound cross- and longitudinal analyses presented in this work evi-
dently indicate that the economic validity of current best-in-practice DC measurements is (at 
least partly) in question. In fact, the qualitative evaluation of the actual state of competition 
based on these DC measures turns out to be rather sensitive to the application of a specific ap-
proach, measure and approximation, respectively. As a logical consequence of the observed 
systematic differences in DC measure values at any level of disaggregation, it becomes obvious 
that decision makers in important and responsible economic positions (e.g., in regulatory insti-
tutions) are subject to a severe threat. Specifically, by referring to a certain approach, measure 
or approximation, higher or lower DC values can be produced for the considered relevant mar-
ket/market segment.  As a final effect, the derived conclusions about the true competition in-
tensity and the suggested recommendations on corporations’ business actions (e.g. the ap-
proval or rejection of mergers) within those markets may be prone to manipulation. 
As an example, consider a major merger in the national British banking market that happened 
in 2008. Specifically, as a consequence of the proclaimed merger plans between Lloyds TSB 
(LLOYDS) and the verging on bankruptcy Halifax Bank Of Scotland (HBOS), several stakeholders, 
competitors and other parties of interest raised severe concerns as to what extent the degree 
of competition in the whole British financial system would be negatively affected both in the 
long as well as the short term. Thus, the Office of Fair Trading (Smith, 2008) was called on to 
make an announcement on the subject matter. As is the predominant practice among regula-
tory organizations and/or advisory institutions such as the OFT, the market concentration in the 
form of the player’s aggregated market shares in the pursued relevant markets was considered. 
As a result, the structure-oriented CR3, CR5 and HHI measures for the resulting post-merger 
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institution exceeded some critical benchmarks. Consequently, the merger was put into ques-
tion and initially suspended due to potential competition concerns20. However, the Bank of Eng-
land and even members of the government (e.g. the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer 
[Minister of Finance] Alistair Darling) intervened in later instances and finally overruled the 
OFT’s concerns, among other reasons for the sake of maintaining the long-term financial stabil-
ity in the whole British financial market. Consequently, in late 2008 LLOYDS and HBOS were 
officially allowed to proceed with the merger, with the deal finally being concluded in January 
2009 mainly via an exchange of shares. 
By way of contrast, consider the following two alternative scenarios: Imagine that an important 
decision maker in an advisory council position had benevolently weighted the two banks’ self-
interested well-being ex ante higher than the long-run persistence of social welfare-maximizing 
competitive market conditions. Following the consistent results of our DC analyses across and 
within the examined countries and the observed time period, the selection of a certain Lerner 
index application would then have produced higher DC measures, thereby indicating a more 
intense (i.e. uncritical) level of competition. As a result, the OFT would have been likely to sup-
port the merger plans of LLOYDS and HBOS initially. On the other hand, when applying the con-
duct-oriented DC measures to assess the degree of competition (Boone indicator and H statis-
tic), which throughout all of our analyses systematically indicate a lower degree of competition 
intensity, it is likely that even the Bank of England would have noticed a certain degree of 
threat towards the British financial market when allowing the respective merger. 
  
As a general suggestion for further academic research, it has to be concluded that the empirical 
implementation of the competition measurement approaches, which are rooted as alternative 
concepts in the general theory of industrial organization, is problematic in the specific field of 
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financial market analyses, especially due to the high data requirements. Thus, regulatory rec-
ommendations for decision makers in the realm of banking systems can only then be formu-
lated when the limitations of the respective research methodology are thoroughly considered.  
In the same vein, subsequent evaluations regarding the stability, profitability and productivity 
of banks or banking systems likewise require a thorough examination of the underlying compe-
tition measurement method. Generally, the regular use of different measurement concepts 
appears reasonable in order to control the sensitivity of the determined degrees of competition 
regarding the applied measurement method.  
An “across-the-board” conclusion as to which specific DC approach, measure or approximation 
is generally preferable in empirical applications in banking systems seems neither reasonable 
nor possible in light of the measurements’ specific strengths and weaknesses. However, in the 
course of further academic research it would be, in fact, of great interest to identify major rea-
sons for and/or drivers of the observed substantial heterogeneity in the DC values produced for 
identical objects (i.e. countries, years of observation).  
In light of the obvious importance of correct DC measurements as discussed in the introduction 
to this work, the following statement by Liu and colleagues (2010) should be carefully taken 
into account before drawing any conclusions about the true competitive state in any financial 
market:  
 
“Given the doubts raised about the efficacy of competition measures caution should be taken 
in formulating regulatory policies and decisions based on the extant empirical literature”. 
 
 
*  *  * 
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NOTES 
 
1 As an example, Berger et al. (2009) administered a DC measurement study to examine the relation be-
tween market power, risk issues and fragility based on a sample of over 8,000 banks across 23 developed 
countries over a time span between 1999 and 2005. Using the DC measure Lerner index, they found that 
banks with a greater degree of market power are less susceptible to risks. They conclude that a dimin-
ished competition in a banking system makes it less fragile in the long run.  
2  In this context, see the recent works of Feng/Zhang (2014) and Carvalho (2014). 
3  As explained in a separate chapter addressing the description of the dataset, the coverage of data along 
those dimensions (time x country x studies [i.e. used DC measures]) is incomplete. Upon request, access 
to the database will be provided to interested researchers (please contact the corresponding author). 
4  For reasons of completeness, it should be noted that besides the supplier’s mere pursuit of profit, other 
reasons may (logically) account for market price levels positioned above marginal costs (e.g. required risk 
premiums). However, whenever market prices exceed the marginal costs, a certain degree of price setting 
power of suppliers is definitely indicated. 
5  Direct DC measures are based on realized market outcomes (e.g., prices, profits) whereas indirect 
measures are oriented towards certain antecedents of this realized market outcome.  
6  Moreover, Bikker and Haaf (2002) propose some further structural measures such as the Hall-Tideman 
index, Hannah-Kay index, U index or the Rosenbluth index. However, to the best of the authors' 
knowledge, those measures are rarely applied in contemporary academic research. 
7  A further prominent DC measure subsumed under this indirect conduct-oriented approach has been de-
veloped and extended by Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). Specifically, by estimating the 
conjectural variation of the enterprises and the price elasticities, the reactions of the competitors are 
herein identified. However, since very detailed and company-specific data is required for computations of 
this measure, it is rarely applied in academic research (as for some of the published applications, see, e.g., 
Shaffer/DiSalvo 1994, Bikker 2003, Uchida/Tsutsui 2005). 
8  For reasons of completeness: Besides monopolistic behavior, negative/zero values of H could also indicate 
perfectly collusive behavior in an oligopoly structure. 
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9  Put differently, it is assumed that the efficient agents perform better and realize (relatively) higher profits 
at the expense of inefficient competitors, thereby further attracting a larger market share from those ri-
vals in the long run. 
10  This depicted causal relation holds under the assumption of a given specific output level only. Note that 
this assumption is a central pillar of Boone’s model.   
11  This is indicated in Table 3 listing the studies reviewed by the authors for this contribution. As for the 
academic research published over the last decade, the Lerner index is the most frequently applied DC 
measure of all the introduced indirect and direct DC measures. 
12  Further, as commonly used in statistical reports but only infrequently applied in academic literature, mar-
ket shares in the business areas of banks are calculated with respect to the number of customers (e.g. cli-
ents using a certain banks’ credit cards or accounts).      
13  Further, as a modification of the Boone indicator, the bank's market share rather than its profits can be 
used to calculate the indicator β (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011, 2013). 
14  In the field of strategic management, it is commonly accepted that defining the business must be seen as 
the starting point in the process of strategic planning (see ABELL). 
15  The reviewed studies were published in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Economic 
Journal, Economics Letters, Applied Economics, among others. 
16  Two of the 150 overall data points in Table 2 (labeled as `n.a.` for Finland in the years 2001 and 2002) are 
missing in the original study due to non-given information. Chapter 3.2 provides further details on how 
missing values/information were generally treated in the present study.  
17  The table’s cell content explained by means of the cell positioned in last row/last column: Under the per-
formance-oriented approach (row P), a total of 8 studies (n=8) reported respective values for the United 
Kingdom (column UK), thereby producing a mean value of 0.85 along with a 0.03 standard deviation (s). 
18  Although this finding seems illogical at first glance, the respective raw data of the original studies provide 
an explanation: The market shares are derived using the balance sheet total– however, sometimes based 
on the yearly average and sometimes based on year-end figures. This example precisely shows the conse-
quences of using different operationalizations of the competition measurements. 
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19  A correlation coefficient according to Bravais-Pearson (r) has been calculated for which the following clas-
sification concerning the strength of the linear relationship is accepted: weak correlation (|r|<0.5), mod-
erate correlation (0.5 < |r| <0.8) and strong correlation (|r| > 0.80) (see Fahrmeir et al. 2011: 139f.). 
20  As an example, consider the product line of personal current accounts (PCA). The OFT argued as follows: 
“On the basis of 2007 market share estimates, the merged entity will be the clear market leader in terms 
of stock of PCAs in Great Britain, with a combined market share of 33 percent (increment 14 percent).38 
The next three players (RBSG, HSBC and Barclays) have market shares between 14 and 17 percent, and 
the concentration ratio of the top four players in the market (C4) is increased by the merger from 67 per-
cent to 80 percent. All other players have shares of less than ten percent each. The post-merger HHI is 
1950, which indicates that this is a highly concentrated market, with an increment of almost 500. The 
Guidance40 states that any market with a post merger HHI in excess of 1000 is concentrated, and that in a 
concentrated market a merger with a delta in excess of 100 may give rise to potential competition con-
cerns”. 
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